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A major insight from theoretical research in information economics is that prof-itable agreements may be severely impeded by private information, and can 
even dry up completely. This was nicely illustrated in the famous market for lemons 
example (George A. Akerlof 1970) and studied in further detail by Roger B. Myerson 
and Mark Satterthwaite (1983) in a context of optimal contracting with two-sided 
private information. More generally, no-trade theorems show that rational, expected 
utility maximizing, Bayesian economic agents will not trade with each other on the 
basis of private information alone (Paul Milgrom and Nancy Stokey 1982, Stephen 
Morris 1994).
In this paper, we study the other side of the coin, namely a situation where 
exchanges (or other types of agreements) are not mutually beneficial and ask the 
following question: can private information induce agents to reach agreements that 
one of them will (ex post) regret? An all-too-familiar example, war, illustrates the 
problem. Suppose there are two nations, either of which would be better off conquer-
ing the other nation rather than coexisting peacefully, and would be worse off being 
conquered. If there is a war, the stronger country conquers the weaker one. Each 
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The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection 
in the Laboratory †
By Juan D. Carrillo and Thomas R. Palfrey*
We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players 
have privately known “strengths” and can decide to fight or compro-
mise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high 
payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff. If both choose 
to compromise, each player receives an intermediate payoff. The 
only equilibrium is for players to always fight. In our experiment, we 
observe frequent compromise, more fighting the lower the compro-
mise payoff and less fighting by first than second movers. We explore 
several theories of cognitive limitations in an attempt to understand 
these anomalous findings. (JEL C91, D82)
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nation makes the choice to attack or not. They remain in peaceful coexistence if 
both choose not to attack, a war ensues otherwise. If one formalizes this problem, 
it is obvious that the strongest nation always has an incentive to attack the weakest 
one. Thus, a war is inevitable. More interestingly, the equilibrium is also war if 
the leader of each nation knows its own military strength but knows only the prob-
ability distribution of the other nation’s strength (and therefore is uncertain over 
his chances of winning). This would be true, for example, even if the benefits of 
winning the war were only slightly greater than the benefits of peace; the costs of 
losing the war were enormous; and the uncertainty about the other nation’s strength 
was large. The logic is much like the unraveling argument in adverse selection 
games. In deciding whether to attack or not, optimal decision making requires the 
agents to condition on their opponent choosing not to attack. Because weaker oppo-
nents are the ones who do not attack, this conditioning will lead stronger opponents 
to attack. Therefore, there will be a marginal strength level which is indifferent 
between peace and war. But this calculus will lead the opponent’s marginal nonat-
tackers to attack, and so forth. The only equilibrium is for the marginal strength 
type to be the weakest type. As developed in Section IA, the same logic applies to 
other situations where parties with conflicting goals and private information can 
reach an agreement that cannot ex post benefit both parties such as litigation, elec-
toral debates, and firm competition.
Here, we report an experiment that investigates behavior in several variations of 
this two-sided asymmetric information environment. In all the variations, the equi-
librium outcome predicted by the theory is the same—fighting ensues with prob-
ability one. We obtain three main results that are all inconsistent with standard game 
theory. First and foremost, fighting occurs much less often than predicted by theory. 
Rather than 1.0, we observe fight probabilities in the range of 0.50–0.70. The out-
come characterized by both agents compromising arises with surprising frequency, 
nearly one-quarter of the time in some sessions. In terms of our example, it means 
that contrary to the predictions of game theory, a war can be avoided if the military 
strengths of countries are privately (rather than publicly) known. Second, fight rates 
are affected by the compromise payoff. In both the sequential and simultaneous treat-
ments, agents are less likely to fight the higher the compromise payoff. Third, in the 
sequential version, the strategies of first and second movers are different in two ways: 
second movers are more likely to fight than first movers; and the behavior of second 
movers is more responsive to strength and less erratic than that of first movers.
We also obtain some findings about individual behavior. Individual choice is con-
sistent with the use of cutpoint strategies—fight if and only if strength is above a 
certain critical threshold. However, instead of the cutpoints being at (or at least close 
to) the minimum strength, as predicted by the theory, we find that players use cut-
points in an intermediate range. The use of cutpoint strategies indicates that subjects 
have some understanding of the game, and the source of violations of equilibrium 
has to do with the cognitive difficulty in choosing the cutpoint optimally. Perhaps 
more interesting, we find substantial heterogeneity in the choice of cutpoints across 
subjects, and also important differences in the distribution of cutpoints across treat-
ments. Finally, all the results are robust with respect to experience, that is, there is 
only a limited evidence of learning.
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We then explore three recent theories of cognitive limitations in games, and 
analyze the data to investigate the extent to which the insights from these alterna-
tive theories can account for these anomalies. The three approaches we explore are 
equilibrium stochastic choice, levels of strategic sophistication, and naïve belief 
formation. The specification of our models for these three approaches are: the logit 
specification of Quantal Response Equilibrium theory (QRE); the Poisson specifi-
cation of the Cognitive Hierarchy model (CH); and a stochastic choice version of 
Cursed Equilibrium (CE), respectively. The estimated parameters for each model are 
relatively constant across treatments. There are some important differences in the 
predictions that lead to differences in the fit of the models, however. Only the QRE 
model captures the tendency of second movers to fight more often than first mov-
ers. The CH and CE models capture the aggregate tendency of players to fight with 
probability close to one when their strength is sufficiently high and with probability 
close to zero when their strength is sufficiently low. The CH model predicts that the 
distribution of individual cutpoints will be multimodal, clustered around three or 
four numbers, which is not reflected in the data. Finally, the best fit is obtained with 
a hybrid of QRE and CE, which combines cursedness and stochastic choice.
I. The Theoretical Model
We analyze the incentives of agents to compromise when they have conflicting 
objectives and asymmetric information. To this end, we study a class of games that 
have unique Nash equilibrium outcomes in which a compromise is never reached.
A. some Introductory Examples
Consider two agents who must decide whether to split a surplus in a prespecified 
manner (compromise) or try to reap all the benefits (no compromise). Both agents 
have private but imperfect information about their likelihood of obtaining the ben-
efits if they do not compromise and, possibly, also their value. The ex post sum of 
utilities may be higher or lower under compromise than under no compromise.
A myriad of situations fit this general description in addition to the example of 
international conflict described in the introduction. In a litigation, the defendant may 
offer a settlement to the plaintiff that can be accepted or not. Both parties have 
private knowledge of the strength of their case and the bias of the jury. In an elec-
toral campaign, each candidate can drive his rival into a public debate, where some 
qualities of the contenders are revealed to voters, affecting the electoral outcome. In 
the absence of a debate, voters must rely on expected qualities. In a product market 
competition, firms offering horizontally differentiated products may start a research 
and deveopment (R&D) race. The winner monopolizes the market and the probabil-
ity of winning is proportional to the privately known quality of the firms research 
department. Alternatively, firms can avoid the race and share the market. In all these 
cases, there are two possible outcomes: settlement, peace, no debate, market sharing 
versus trial, war, debate, R&D race, respectively. The first outcome needs the agree-
ment of both players, whereas each player can unilaterally force the second outcome. 
Payoffs depend on the state of the world, which is not realized or revealed until after 
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all players have acted. Also, the utility of agents under the different outcomes may 
depend on some exogenously given private information parameters. Payoffs under 
agreement are typically determined by the status quo, whereas payoffs under no 
agreement are typically determined by a winner-takes-all rule. More generally, in 
the no agreement outcome, there is always one (ex post) winner and one (ex post) 
loser relative to the agreement outcome. The total surplus from compromise varies 
across these different applications, although we show below that the equilibrium 
does not depend on the compromise payoffs. Wars are typically costly and socially 
inefficient, so there is a peace dividend. Litigation also involves a waste of resources 
when compared to early settlements (but not compared to last minute settlements). 
Electoral debates are roughly neutral if candidates are only interested in winning the 
election. However, they provide information regarding the merits of different pro-
posals, which can be valuable if candidates also care about policy outcomes. As for 
market competition, the profits of a monopolist are typically higher than the sum of 
profits of two duopolists, which suggests that firms’ surplus increases when fighting 
for supremacy rather than splitting the market.1
B. Formalizing the Game
We formalize the problem as follows. Denote by si [ si and sj [ sj the privately 
known “strength” of agents i and j, with i, j [ 51, 26 and i Z j (case strength, military 
capacity, politician’s talent, research quality). These values are drawn from continu-
ous and commonly known distributions Fi 1si Z sj 2 , possibly different and possibly cor-
related. For technical convenience, we assume strictly positive densities fi 1si Z sj 2 for 
all si and sj. Agent i chooses action ai [ A 5 5r, f6, where r stands for “retreat” and 
f for “fight.” If a1 5 a2 5 r, there is compromise (settlement, peace, no debate, no 
race) and the payoff of agent i is bi 1s1, s22 . Otherwise, there is no compromise (trial, 
war, debate, race), and the payoff of agent i is ai 1s1, s22 if si . sj and gi 1s1, s22 if si 
, sj, with ai 1s1, s22 . bi 1s1, s22 . gi 1s1, s22 for all i, s1, s2. Note that, ex post, a com-
promise is always beneficial to one agent and detrimental to the other. The pair of 
strengths 1si, sj 2 determines the winner and the loser. Payoffs under compromise and 
no compromise are given exogenously, although they may be unknown at the time 
of making the decision if they depend on 1s1, s22 . Last, depending on the context, the 
socially efficient action may be compromise or no compromise, or it may even be a 
zero-sum game, ai 1s1, s22 1 gj 1s1, s22 x bi 1s1, s22 1 bj 1s1, s22 for all si . sj.
C. Equilibrium
Given this structure, we can analyze the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) for 
the sequential version of the game, where agent 1 moves first and agent 2 moves 
second. We have the following result.
PROPOSITION 1: In all PBE of the game, the outcome is “no compromise.”
1 In these examples, we are not including the welfare of third parties such as society, voters, or consumers. 
These are also likely to be different across applications and outcomes.
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PROOF:
Suppose that there exists two sets, s˜1 7 s1 and s˜2 1s˜12 7 s2, such that in a PBE of 
the game a11s12 5 r and a2 1s22 5 r with positive probability for all s1 [ s˜1 and s2 [ 
s˜2 1s˜12 .2 Denote by s¯1 5 maxs1[s˜1 and s¯2 5 maxs2[s˜2 1s˜12 . According to this PBE, once 
agent 2 has observed a1 5 r, the following inequality must be satisfied:
 3
s1[s˜1
b2 1s1, s22 dF11s1 Z s1 [ s˜1, s22 $ 3
s1[s˜1>s1,s2
a2 1s1, s22 dF11s1 Z s1 [ s˜1, s22
   1 3
s1[s˜1>s1.s2
g2 1s1, s22 dF11s1 Z s1 [ s˜1, s22 5 s2 [ s˜2 1s˜12 ,
where the l.h.s. is agent 2’s expected payoff if a2 5 r, and the r.h.s. is his expected 
payoff if a2 5 f. This condition must hold in particular for s2 5 s¯2. Since a2 1s1, s22 . 
b2 1s1, s22 . g2 1s1, s22 , the inequality necessarily implies that s1 . s¯2 for some s1 [ s˜1. 
Therefore, s¯2 , s¯1. Now, agent 1’s decision is relevant only if a2 5 r. Thus, for the 
strategy described above to be a PBE, the following inequality must also hold:
 3
s2[s˜2 1s˜12 b11s1, s22 dF2 1s2 Z s12 $ 3s2[s˜2 1s˜12>s2,s1a11s1, s22 dF2 1s2 Z s12
   1 3
s2[s˜2 1s˜12>s2.s1g11s1, s22 dF2 1s2 Z s12 5 s1 [ s˜1  .
Using the same reasoning as before, s¯1 , s¯2. Since both inequalities cannot be satis-
fied at the same time, s˜1 Z ~ and s˜2 1s˜12 Z ~ cannot both occur in equilibrium.
The intuition is simple. In this class of games, agents know that good news for 
them is bad news for their rival. Thus, they have opposing interests for when to reach 
a compromise. As a result, whenever one agent wants to compromise, the other 
should not want to. For instance, country 1 has an incentive to stay in peaceful coex-
istence whenever its military strength, s1, is low. However, this is precisely when 
country 2 wants to force a war. In other words, in these games, one agent’s gain is 
always the other agent’s loss (of same or different magnitude, it does not matter). 
Since a compromise is broken as soon as one agent does not find it profitable, the fact 
that an agent wants to deal implies that the other should not accept it, and vice versa. 
The bottom line is that, in equilibrium, compromises are never possible. We want 
to stress the generality of this result, which holds for any distribution of strengths 
(the same or different for both players) and any correlation between the players’ 
strengths. Since the results hold for any payoffs satisfying ai . bi . gi , it means 
that introducing risk aversion would not change the outcome of the game. Last, the 
2 Positive probability rather than probability 1 takes care of pure and mixed strategies at the same time.
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result is also unchanged if agents play simultaneously. Indeed, the only difference 
with the sequential game is that agent 2 will not compare his options conditional on 
having observed the choice of agent 1. However, this does not make any difference 
since, both in the sequential and the simultaneous versions, each agent knows that 
his action is only relevant if the rival offers a compromise. Thus, the outcome of 
the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is always no compromise, just as it is for the 
PBE. This result is summarized as follows.
COROLLARy 1: The outcome of the game is still “no compromise” if agents are 
risk averse and/or if they announce their strategy simultaneously.
II. Laboratory Experiment
A. description of the Game
This is a simplified version of the game described earlier. Each agent indepen-
dently draws a number from a uniform distribution on 30, 14 and privately observes 
their own number, which we refer to as the player’s strength, si. Agent 1 chooses 
whether to “fight,” f, or “retreat,” r. If 1 chooses f, then the game ends. The agent 
with highest strength receives a win payoff h, and the other agent receives a loss 
payoff L 1, h2 . If agent 1 chooses r, then it is agent 2’s turn. If agent 2 chooses f, 
then as before, the agent with highest strength receives a payoff of h and the other 
receives a payoff of L. If, instead, agent 2 also chooses r, then agent 1 and agent 2 
each obtains a pre-specified “compromise payoff,” M, where L , M , h. Thus, the 
main simplification relative to the theoretical model presented in Section I is that 
the win, lose, and compromise payoffs are all independent of 1s1, s22 . Each player’s 
strength only affects payoffs via the likelihood of winning under no compromise. 
We look at several variations on this game.3
Variant 1. h 5 1, L 5 0, M 5 0.50 with sequential move.
Variant 2. h 5 1, L 5 0, M 5 0.39 with sequential move.
Variant 3. h 5 1, L 5 0, M 5 0.50 with simultaneous move.
Variant 4. h 5 1, L 5 0, M 5 0.39 with simultaneous move.
In our design, the total surplus under compromise is either smaller than 
(M 5 0.39) or equal to (M 5 0.50) the total surplus under no compromise. As dis-
cussed earlier, this specific choice of parameters fits some examples (firm competition, 
electoral debate) better than others (military conflict, litigation). There were at least 
two reasons for focusing on these values. First, the M 5 0.50 is a natural benchmark, 
corresponding to a constant sum game, where there is no difference in the efficiency 
3 The nominal payoffs in the experiment are: h 5 95, L 5 5, M [ 550, 406. Here, we present the scaled ver-
sion 1x 2 52/90.
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of the fight and compromise outcomes. Second, we wanted to choose another value 
of M because the various behavioral theories we were testing all predict a negative 
comparative static effect of M on the probability of fighting. Changes in either direc-
tion would allow us to test this. Our choice of a lower value of M was made because 
we thought it was the more interesting direction, since, for M , 0.5, always fighting is 
not only still the unique Nash equilibrium but is also ex ante efficient and ex ante fair. 
This allows us to better distinguish social preference or fairness-based explanations for 
excessive compromise (see Section IVE) from behavioral models based on cognitive 
limitations (see Sections IVA to IVD), and also gives Nash equilibrium its best shot. 
If the excessive compromise disappears, this would lend support for social preference 
theories based on ex ante fairness and efficiency, whereas, if the excessive compromise 
persists, it lends support for the models of cognitive limitations.
B. relation to the Experimental Literature
Some related games have been studied in the laboratory. Below we describe two 
simultaneous games of multi-sided asymmetric information, two sequential games 
of one-sided asymmetric information and one static game of full information.
The Betting Game.—(Doron Sonsino, Ido Erev, and Sharon Gilat 2001; ylva Sovic 
2004; Colin F. Camerer, Palfrey, and Brian W. Rogers 2006). An asset yielding a 
fixed surplus can be traded between agents who have private information. Trade 
occurs only if both agents agree. As in our game, all the BNE imply no trade. There 
are three main differences. First, the risky outcome requires agreement in the bet-
ting game, whereas the safe outcome requires agreement in the compromise game. 
Second, the information structure is simpler than it is in ours. There are only four 
possible states, and in two of them one agent has full information. The common 
knowledge of this information partition triggers very naturally unraveling to no 
trade. This special partition is also likely to facilitate learning. Third, a sequential 
version of the betting game has not been studied.
Auction of a common Value Good and the Winner’s curse.—(John H. Kagel 
and Dan Levin 2002). As in our game, agents will play suboptimally if they do not 
anticipate the information contained in the rival’s action. Our game allows for some 
simple comparative statics (different timings and different compromise payoffs). 
Also, our BNE and PBE are simple to compute.
Adverse selection Game.—(Akerlof 1970). This game also predicts some unrav-
eling. However, the robust conclusion is the existence of a cutoff below which 
there is agreement or trade and above which there is not. This cutoff can be the 
lower bound (i.e., never agree as in our game), but it can also be the upper bound 
(i.e., always agree) or an interior value, depending on the parameters of the game. 
William Samuelson and Max Bazerman (1985) show that the probability that buyers 
engage in unfavorable trades is increasing in the complexity of the adverse selection 
game. Charles A. Holt and Roger Sherman (1994) prove that buyers may underbid 
or overbid depending on the treatment conditions. Note that because it is one-sided 
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asymmetric information, the buyer’s action has no signaling value. There have also 
been several market experiments with informed sellers and asymmetric information 
about product quality (Michael Lynch et al. 1984).
Blind Bidding Game.—(Robert Forsythe, R. Mark Isaac, and Palfrey 1989). This 
experiment determines whether an informed seller reveals the quality of his good 
to an uninformed buyer. Full revelation occurs because the seller with the highest 
quality good always has an incentive to announce it, then so does the seller with the 
second highest quality good, and so on. However, there is no role for the key effect of 
our game, namely the anticipation of information conveyed by the rival’s action.
Beauty contest.—(Rosemarie Nagel 1995). As in our game, best response dynam-
ics predicts unraveling for a wide range of parameters. Since the beauty contest is a 
static game of complete information, the details of convergence are different. Even 
the most naïve learning rules (such as “play optimally given the outcome in the past 
round and assuming that nobody else revises his strategy”) predict rapid convergence 
if the beauty contest game is played repeatedly. The experimental data confirms this 
prediction, and a natural question is whether a similar convergence pattern is found 
in the compromise game.
C. Experimental design and Procedures
We conducted five sessions with a total of 56 subjects, using a simple 2 3 2 design. 
The subjects were registered Princeton University students who were recruited by 
e-mail solicitation, and all sessions were conducted at The Princeton Laboratory for 
Experimental Social Science. All interaction in a session was computerized using 
an extension of the open source software package Multistage Games.4 No subject 
participated in more than one session. The two dimensions of treatment variation 
were the compromise payoff (M 5 0.50 versus M 5 0.39 ) and the order of moves 
(simultaneous versus sequential play). In each session, subjects made decisions dur-
ing 40 rounds, with M fixed throughout the session. Half of the subjects participated 
in sessions with M 5 0.39, and half of the subjects participated in sessions with M 
5 0.50. In all sessions, we set h 5 1 and L 5 0. Each subject played exactly one 
game with one opponent in each round, with random rematching after each round. 
At the beginning of each round, t, each subject was independently assigned a new 
strength, sit , drawn from a uniform distribution on 30, 14 .5 Each subject observed his 
own strength but had to make the fight-retreat decision before observing the strength 
of the subject they were matched with. The opponent’s strength was revealed only at 
the end of the round.
At the beginning of each session, instructions were read by the experimenter, 
who was standing on a stage in the front of the experiment room and who fully 
4 Documentation and instructions for downloading the software can be found at http://multistage.ssel. 
caltech.edu.
5 In the experimental implementation of payoffs, the h and L payoffs paid off $0.57 and $0.03, respectively. 
The compromise payoff, M, was scaled accordingly at $0.30 and $0.24 for the two treatments.
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explained the rules, information structure, 
and client GUI for the simultaneous move 
game. A sample copy of the instructions is 
in the Web Appendix (http://www.aeaweb.
org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.1.1.151). 
After the instructions were finished, two 
practice rounds were conducted, for which 
subjects received no payment. After the 
practice rounds, there was an interactive, 
computerized comprehension quiz that all subjects had to answer correctly before 
proceeding to the paid rounds. For the first 20 paid rounds of a session, subjects 
played the simultaneous version of the game. At the end of round 20, there was 
a brief instruction period during which rules for the sequential version of the 
game were explained. In each match of the sequential version, one of the two 
players was selected randomly to be the first mover. After the first mover made 
a fight-retreat choice, the second mover was informed of that choice, but was not 
informed of the strength of the first mover. If the first mover’s choice was fight, 
the second mover had no choice, and simply clicked a button on the screen labeled 
“continue.” If the first mover’s choice was retreat, the second mover had a choice 
between fight and retreat. After the second mover made a choice, the match ended 
and the strength levels and outcome were revealed. The subjects then participated 
in 20 additional rounds of the sequential version of the game, with opponents, 
roles (first or second mover), and strengths randomly reassigned at the beginning 
of each round. Subjects were paid the sum of their earnings over all rounds in 
cash, in private, immediately following the session. Sessions averaged one hour in 
length, and subject earnings averaged $25. Table 1 displays the pertinent details 
of the five sessions.
III. A Descriptive Analysis of the Results
In this section, we provide a descriptive analysis of the experimental results. We 
discuss the main aggregate features of the data, including the mean rates of fight 
and retreat (overall and as a function of strength) and explore time trends. We com-
pare the data to two natural benchmarks. The first benchmark is Nash equilibrium, 
in which all players always choose f regardless of strength (and, in the sequential 
version, regardless of the choice of the first mover). A second, weaker benchmark 
is the type-independent model, where the probability of fighting is independent of 
strength. We study the differences in probabilities of fighting as a function of the 
compromise payoff and the timing of the game. Last, we analyze the data at an indi-
vidual level. For each player, we estimate a decision rule that maps strength into the 
probability of fighting.
A. Aggregate Fight rates unconditional on strength
The simplest cut at the data is to compare the relative frequencies of choosing 
fight versus retreat, without conditioning on the actual draws of si . Table 2 shows the 
Table 1—Session Details for the 
Experiment
Session No. of subjects M
   1 8 0.50
   2 8 0.50
   3 12 0.50
   4 14 0.39
   5 14 0.39
160 AMErIcAn EconoMIc JournAL: MIcroEconoMIcs FEBruArY 2009
relative fight rates in the experiment, broken 
down by compromise payoff and order of 
moves, with the number of observations in 
parentheses.6
There are several differences in fight rates 
across treatments and conditions.
First, there is a clear difference between 
f rates in the M 5 0.39 and the M 5 0.50 treatments. Fighting is chosen approxi-
mately 13 percent more frequently when the compromise dividend is lower, and 
this difference is statistically significant ( p , 0.01).7 This difference is observed in 
both the sequential and simultaneous treatments, for both the first and second mov-
ers separately, and these differences are all approximately the same magnitude. In 
looking at subsamples based on treatment or condition, the lower significant levels 
reflect the relatively small number of observations in each treatment: p 5 0.05 level 
for the simultaneous treatment (most observations), p 5 0.10 level for the sequential 
treatment, and p . 0.10 for first movers and second movers, separately.
Second, first movers in the sequential game fight less frequently than second mov-
ers, both in the 0.39 and the 0.50 treatments. The differences in means are not sta-
tistically significant.
Third, there is more fighting in the simultaneous treatment than in the sequential 
treatment. These results are mirrored in a simple probit dummy variable regression, 
where the dependent variable is whether a subject chose to fight and the independent 
variables are M, “sim” (5 1 for the simultaneous treatment), and “role” (5 1 for sec-
ond movers). The estimated coefficients and standard errors are given in Table 3.
The logic of the game suggests that, over time, learning should lead to unrav-
eling. That is, perceptive players should be able to realize that they will improve 
their payoff by adopting a cutoff strategy lower than the cutoff strategy used by 
their opponent. Given the symmetry of the game, they should realize that perceptive 
opponents will also notice this. The unravelling logic may be responsible for the 
higher fighting rates of second relative to first movers. It also suggests that f rates 
should be increasing over time in all treatments. We investigate this hypothesis by 
breaking the data down into early and late matches. In each session, there were 20 
rounds each of the sequential and the simultaneous games. We code the choices in 
6 Due to a software error, four rounds of data in the sequential M 5 0.50 treatment were mistakenly conducted 
as practice rounds. Hence, there are slightly less observations in this treatment than in the other treatments.
7 The significance levels reported here and later in the paper are based on standard tests treating the observa-
tions as independent. Later in the paper, we consider individual effects and learning.
Table 2—Unconditional Fight Rates
Order Position M 5 0.39  M 5 0.50 Pooled
Sequential First 0.589 (280) 0.538 (264) 0.564 (544)
Sequential Second  0.643 (115) 0.566 (122) 0.603 (237)
Sequential  Both 0.605 (395) 0.547 (386) 0.576 (781)
Simultaneous — 0.657 (560) 0.573 (560) 0.616 (1120)
Pooled  0.636 (955) 0.562 (946) 0.599 (1901)
Table 3—Probit Regression of Fight Rates
 Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
Constant 1.023 0.267 3.83
M 20.019 0.006 23.29
sim 0.134 0.066 2.03
role 0.106 0.099 1.08
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the first ten rounds of each version of the game as “inexperienced” and the last ten 
rounds of each  version as “experienced.” Table 4 presents the f rates broken down 
by experience level. The number of observations is in parenthesis.
The effect of experience on the unconditional f rates is ambiguous. In four of 
the six comparisons, the f rate increases, as hypothesized, although it remains 
well below 1. All four such differences are statistically significant. In two of the six 
comparisons, f decreases, but these two changes are not significant. Furthermore, 
the two treatments where f decreases have no apparent relationship to each other 
(simultaneous with M50.50 and the second player in sequential with M50.39).
B. Aggregate Fight rates conditional on strength
The analysis above, while providing a useful sketch of the results, falls short of 
giving a complete picture of the aggregate data because the unconditional f rates 
are not a sufficient statistic for the actual strategies. A behavior strategy in each 
game is a probability of choosing f conditional on s. By aggregating across all the 
(strength, action) paired observations for a treatment, we can graphically display the 
aggregate empirical behavior strategy, and then compare this strategy across treat-
ments. Figure 1 shows six graphs. The graphs on the left correspond to M 5 0.39, 
and the graphs on the right are for M 5 0.50. The middle and bottom graphs are for 
the first and second movers in the sequential treatment, and the top graphs are for the 
simultaneous movers. The strength is on the horizontal axis on a scale of 0 to 100, 
and the empirical fighting frequencies are on the vertical axis on a scale of 0 to 1. 
Thus, for example, if all subjects were to choose the same cutoff strategy, s*, then we 
would observe a step function, with a probability of fighting equal to zero below s* 
and equal to one above s*. Note that functions need not be monotonically increasing, 
although we expect that players with higher strength will be more likely to fight. The 
empirical frequencies are aggregated into bins of five units of strength (1–5, 6–10, 
etc.) along the horizontal axis, with f-probabilities in the vertical axis.
These graphs suggest that second movers in the sequential version of the game 
behave differently from first movers in at least two ways. Second movers fight more 
than first movers. If one looks at the point in the graph where the fight probabilities 
first reach 50 percent, this switchpoint is in the high 20s for second movers in both 
the 0.39 and 0.50 treatments, while it is in the mid- to high 30s for simultaneous 
movers and even higher for the first movers in the sequential treatment. These results 
are also supported by a probit regression similar to the one reported in Table 3, 
but including the independent variable s to control for strength. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are reported in Table 5. Two important new results emerge when 
Table 4—Unconditional Fight Rates by Experience Level
 M 5 0.39 M 5 0.50
Order Role Inexperienced Experienced Inexperienced Experienced
Sequential First 0.564 (140) 0.614 (140) 0.484 (124) 0.586 (140)
Sequential Second 0.672 (61) 0.611 (54) 0.484 (64) 0.655 (58)
Simultaneous — 0.611 (280) 0.704 (280) 0.582 (280) 0.564 (280)
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 controlling for strength. First, the difference 
in fight rates between the simultaneous and 
sequential treatments, which was significant 
without controlling for s, is no longer sig-
nificant, indicating that the earlier finding 
was due to the different realizations of s in 
the two samples. Second, the coefficient on 
“role” is now marginally significant, sug-
gesting that the variation in sample draws of s obscured the differences between the 
fight rates of first and second movers.
The figure also suggests that second movers display less erratic behavior, in the 
sense that for low values they (almost) never fight and for high values they (almost) 
Table 5—Probit Regression of Fight Rates, 
Controlling for Strength
 Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
Constant 20.487 0.376 21.296
M 20.041 0.008 24.906
sim 0.076 0.093 0.818
role 0.229 0.139 1.640
s 0.054 0.002 26.364
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Figure 1. Empirical Fight Rates
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always fight. This is reflected in a steeper response curve for player 2 shown in 
Figure 1. Table 6 describes aggregate behavior by treatment and position via a pro-
bit model, where the independent variables are strength and a constant term. The 
steeper response by the second mover is confirmed for the 0.39 treatment, where the 
slope of the second mover’s response curve is significantly steeper than the slope of 
the first mover. There is no significant difference in the slope coefficient for the 0.50 
treatment.
C. Individual cutpoint Analysis
In order to address the question of conditional fight rates, treatment effects, and 
differences between first and second movers more carefully, we turn to an analysis 
of individual choice behavior. If subjects use cutpoint decision rules, how do cut-
points vary across treatments? How much variation is there across individuals? How 
consistent is individual behavior with cutpoint decision rules? We document that 
there is some heterogeneity across subjects but, more importantly, the distribution of 
these cutpoint strategies varies systematically across treatments.
In order to estimate cutpoint decision rules, we use a simple optimal classifica-
tion procedure, similar to Palfrey and Jeffrey E. Prisbrey (1996) and Alessandra 
Casella, Andrew Gelman, and Palfrey (2006). For each subject and each condition 
the subject is in, we look at the set of strengths they were randomly assigned and 
the corresponding fight/retreat decision they made. For any hypothetical cutpoint 
strategy for an individual subject, we can then ask how many of these decisions 
are correctly classified. For example, if in some round a subject with strength 40 
chose f, the decision would be classified correctly only if the hypothetical cutpoint 
were less than or equal to 40. We then use the hypothetical cutpoint with the fewest 
misclassified decisions as the estimate for that individual and condition. If there are 
multiple best-fitting cutpoints, we take the average. Table 7 presents some cutpoint 
summary statistics.
Several observations are immediate. First, very few decisions are misclassified. 
In each of the simultaneous treatments, 16 of 28 subjects are perfectly classified. 
Table 6—Probit Comparing Slope of Response for First and Second Movers
Position M Constant Slope 2ln L % pred. Observations
First mover 0.39 22.73 (0.307) 0.068 (0.0071) 76.7 88.6 280
Second mover 0.39 23.11 (0.585) 0.088 (0.0016) 21.6 92.2 115
First mover 0.50 22.53 (0.283) 0.056 (0.0057) 83.4 87.1 264
Second mover 0.50 21.83 (0.162) 0.044 (0.0063) 45.6 86.9 122
Table 7—Cutpoint Summary Statistics
Condition M Median estimated cutpoint Percentage misclassified Empirical optimum
Simultaneous  0.39 37.5 3.4 17
Simultaneous 0.50 45.5 3.7 26
First mover 0.39 42.5 2.1 15
First mover 0.50 42.0 2.3 18
Second mover 0.39 36.0 0.0 18
Second mover 0.50 38.0 0.8 26
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In the sequential conditions, the number of perfectly classified subjects range from 
23 to 28 of 28. The worst case of misclassification was one subject in the simul-
taneous, M 5 0.50 treatment who has 5 misclassified observations. Thus, with 
rare exceptions, subjects use cutpoint strategies. In our setting, it establishes that 
subjects have a basic understanding of the game, even if they do not play the Nash 
equilibrium strategy. Our subjects follow the first step of the logic (best responses 
are cutpoints) but fail at the second one (equilibrium unraveling). Although inter-
esting, this result is not the central point of the section. We document it to justify 
our approach of comparing the distributions of estimated cutpoints across experi-
mental conditions.
The key questions concern whether the distribution of cutpoints varies system-
atically across treatments and, in the sequential games, between first and second 
movers. We also want to understand whether these systematic variations are consis-
tent with the descriptive findings based on aggregate data described in the previous 
section. Table 7 reports the median estimated cutpoint across all subjects, and the 
percentage of misclassified decisions by condition. The median cutpoints mirror the 
aggregate fight rates by treatment and condition, as reported in previous sections. 
Cutpoints are lower (more fighting) in M 5 0.39 than in M 5 0.50 treatments. They 
are lower for second movers than first movers for both the M 5 0.39 and M 5 0.50 
treatments, and they are lower for second movers than for players in the simultane-
ous condition for both the M 5 0.39 and M 5 0.50 treatments. There is no systematic 
difference between first movers and players in the simultaneous condition. Last, 
second movers have fewer classification errors (therefore, steeper response curves) 
than first movers.
As further evidence, we consider how the entire distribution of individual esti-
mated cutpoints varies across treatments. Figure 2 displays the estimated cumulative 
frequency distribution of individual cutpoints used by our subjects for all the treat-
ments. They are broken down by position in the sequential treatment. The horizontal 
axis represents cutpoints ranging from 0 to 100. The vertical axis indicates how 
many of the subjects in each treatment or position (out of 28) were using a cutpoint 
less than or equal to that number.
These distributions exhibit a wide range of estimated cutpoints with few above 
60 or below 20. In all treatments and conditions, there is heterogeneity that is both 
significant (one easily rejects the hypothesis that all subjects use the same cutpoint 
for any of these conditions) and substantial. The distributions are also different 
across treatments and conditions. Also noteworthy is that distributions are never 
concentrated around particular cutpoints (i.e., step distribution functions), but they 
are smoothly and uniformly increasing over the range.
Finally, one can compare the distribution of cutpoints used by players in the 
game to the cutpoint that would be optimal, given the actual frequencies of fight-
ing in the experiment. These “empirically optimal” cutpoints are given in the last 
column of Table 7. The optimal cutpoints are generally about one-half times the 
corresponding median estimated cutpoints. Many, but not all, players are “fooled” 
by this game, in the sense that they set cutpoints that are too high. We find that 
20 percent of the estimated cutpoints are within 5 units of strength of the optimal 
cutpoint, and these subjects are leaving essentially no money on the table. Of the 
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remaining estimated cutpoints, 7 percent are below the optimal cutpoint by at least 
5 strength units, and 73 percent are above the optimal cutpoint by at least 5 units.
D. summary of descriptive Analysis
The main findings of our analysis, so far, can be summarized as follows:
	 • Unconditional fight probabilities range from about 0.5 to 0.7, depending on the 
treatment and condition, falling far short of the theoretical prediction of 1.0.
	 • In all treatments, the probability of fighting conditional on strength increases 
monotonically from virtually 0 for strengths below 20 to virtually 1 for 
strengths above 60 if M 5 0.39 or above 70 if M 5 0.50.
	 • The compromise payoff, M, affects behavior, with less fighting when the com-
promise payoff is higher.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Cutpoints by Condition
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	 • There are some differences between the sequential and simultaneous treatments. 
Most striking is that second movers behave differently than first movers. The 
former display more fighting and less erratic behavior (when M 5 0.39) than 
the latter. For a theory to explain this pattern, it must predict that observing the 
behavior of the rival before making inferences and choices leads to systematic 
differences compared with just conditioning on a hypothetical event.
	 • We do not find consistent evidence of learning. A possible explanation is the 
insufficient feedback provided to players (only the rival’s strength and outcome 
is revealed at the end of each round). However, given that the order of moves 
matters, one would expect that second movers would use their experience in 
that role when they subsequently play as first mover.8
	 • The vast majority of subjects use cutpoint strategies with very few deviations. 
Across all treatments, over 97 percent of individual behavior is consistent with 
cutpoint strategies. This shows their understanding, at least at an intuitive 
level, that the expected payoff differential between f and r increases with 
s, and possibly an even deeper understanding that the best reply in this game 
is always a cutpoint strategy. It also justifies the analysis that focuses on esti-
mated cutpoints.
	 • The distribution of these cutpoints varies by condition in ways that mirror the 
differences in the aggregate fight rates. The empirical distribution of individual 
cutpoints is smooth.
IV. Alternative Behavioral Models
Obviously, the Nash equilibrium model is inconsistent with our data. In this sec-
tion, we consider several alternative models to explain the excessively low fight rates. 
Note that this game is easily solved by iterated dominance but only using weak 
rather than strict dominance. Denote a strategy as a function that maps strength into 
a probability of fighting q : 30, 14 S 30, 14 . First, note that any strategy q that assigns 
q 112 , 1 is dominated weakly by the strategy q9, where q9 1s 2 5 q 1s 2 for all s Z 1 
and q9 112 5 1. In the experiments, the type distribution was discrete, so once we 
eliminate all those strategies, then any strategy q that assigns q 10.992 , 1 and q 112 
5 1 is weakly dominated by the strategy q9, where q9 1s 2 5 q 1s 2 for all s Z 0.99 and 
q9 10.992 5 1, and so forth.9 On the other hand, rationalizability does not eliminate 
any strategy, since every strategy is a weak best response to the equilibrium strategy, 
q* 1s 2 5 1 for all s.
We consider two categories of models. Models in the first category have their 
foundations in cognitive limitations, and they all have features that admit the pos-
sibility of observing weakly dominated strategies. We study three models within 
this class: quantal response equilibrium or QRE (Richard D. McKelvey and Palfrey 
8 Recall that, in our design, all players gain experience as both first and second movers. That is, our data on 
first and second movers are all coming from the same subjects. Subjects apparently do not draw inferences from 
their own decision making in different roles about how other subjects behave in those roles.
9 For the M 5 0.50 game, at the last iteration, a player with the lowest strength, s 5 0.01, is indifferent between 
f and r, and therefore, there is an equilibrium with s 5 0.01 types choosing r and all other types choosing f. For 
the M 5 0.39 game, the iteration continues all the way down, and the only equilibrium is q* 1s 2 5 1 for all s.
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1995), cognitive hierarchy or CH (Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong 
2004), and cursed equilibrium or CE (Eric Eyster and Matthew Rabin 2005).10 We 
also consider some variations that allow for heterogeneity or hybridization between 
models such as the truncated quantal response equilibrium or TQRE (Camerer, 
Palfrey, and Rogers 2006). This hybrid version allows us to understand better how 
different models capture different features of the observed behavior. Models in the 
second category have their foundations on the existence of systematic deviations 
from self-interest—social preferences, fairness motives, reciprocity, or altruism. For 
reasons we discuss later, we estimate only models in the first category.
A. Quantal response Equilibrium
Quantal response equilibrium applies stochastic choice theory to strategic games. 
It is motivated by the idea that a decision maker may take a suboptimal action, and 
the probability of doing so is increasing in the expected payoff of the action. In a 
regular QRE (Jacob K. Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey 2005), one simply replaces the 
best response correspondence used to characterize Nash equilibrium with a quantal 
response function that is continuous and monotone in expected payoffs. That is, the 
probability of choosing a strategy is a continuous increasing function of the expected 
payoff of using that strategy, and strategies with higher payoffs are used with higher 
probability than strategies with lower payoffs. A quantal response equilibrium is 
then a fixed point of the quantal response mapping. In a logit equilibrium, for any 
two strategies, the log odds of the choice probabilities are proportional to the dif-
ference in expected payoffs, where the proportionality factor, l, is a measure of 
responsiveness of choices to payoffs. That is,
 sij ln c       d 5 l 3uij 2 uik 4 ,
sik
where sij is the probability that player i chooses strategy j, and uij is the correspond-
ing expected payoff in equilibrium. Note that a higher l reflects a “more precise” 
response to the payoff differential. The polar cases l 5 0 and l S 1` correspond 
to random choice and Nash equilibrium, respectively.
specification of the QrE Model.—We consider two different specifications of the 
logit equilibrium version of QRE. The first specification takes an interim approach 
and analyzes the game in behavioral strategies. This approach corresponds to the 
agent QRE (AQRE) of McKelvey and Palfrey (1998). Conditional on player 1’s 
strength and given the AQRE behavioral strategies used by player 2, the log-odds 
of player 1 choosing retreat versus fight is proportional to the difference in expected 
payoffs between retreat and fight, and similarly for player 2.
The second analyzes the game in ex ante strategies, and assumes players choose 
stochastically over possible plans for whether or not to fight as a function of strength. 
10 Some preliminary findings about CH and CE are discussed in Stephanie Wang (2006) with permission of 
the authors.
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Because the set of all possible pure strategies in our game is huge (2100), we are 
forced to consider only a subset of such strategies. The natural restriction is to 
consider only monotone strategies, i.e., cutpoint strategies. This is a natural cri-
terion since monotone strategies are always best responses and, furthermore, any 
nonmonotone strategy is dominated weakly by a monotone strategy. This also 
reduces the set of pure strategies to a small enough number (100) that estimation is 
possible. Last, focusing on cutpoint strategies does not seem too restrictive, given 
that the behavior of individuals is highly consistent with this type of play, as previ-
ously documented.
In the logit parameterization of the cutpoint QRE, the distribution over cutpoint 
strategies used by player 2 has the standard property. Namely, the log odds of player 
1 choosing any cutpoint c versus any other cutpoint c9 is proportional to the ex ante 
difference in expected payoffs between using those two cutpoints, and similarly for 
player 2.
Logit QrE in Behavioral strategies.—For any response parameter l, we solve for 
a fixed point in behavioral strategies. Denote by fl
* such an equilibrium fixed point 
and by fl
* 1s 2 the equilibrium probability of fighting given a strength s.
First, consider the simultaneous game. We need to determine the expected utility 
of f for a player with strength s conditional on the other player using strategy fl
* and 
having chosen r. This is simply equal to the conditional probability that the other 
player has strength less than s, given that he has chosen r. It is then given by
 3
0
s 31 2fl* 1t 2 4 dt
(1)  Vf 1s; fl*2 5                 .
 3
0
1 31 2 fl* 1t 2 4 dt
The expected utility of r conditional on the other player having chosen r is simply 
Vr 1s; fl* 2 5 M, so the difference in the expected utility of f and r is
 D 1s; fl* 2 5 3
0
131 2 fl* 1t 2 4 dt 1Vf 1s; fl* 2 2 Vr 1s; fl* 2 2 5 3
0
s 31 2 fl* 1t 2 4 dt 2 M3
0
131 2 fl* 1t 2 4 dt.
Hence, in a symmetric logit QRE, fl
*  is characterized by
 elD(s; fl* )
 fl
* 1s 2 5              for all s [ 30, 14 .
 1 1 elD(s; fl* )
The sequential game requires solving simultaneously for fl
*
11s12 and fl*2 1s22 . The 
expressions for the first mover are exactly the same as in the simultaneous move 
game. Therefore, modifying the notation slightly to make clear that it is player 1’s 
equation, we get
 elD1(s1; f*l2)
 fl
*
11s12 5                for all s1 [ 30, 14 ,
 1 1 elD1(s1; f*l2)
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where
 D11s1; fl*22 5 3
0
s1 31 2 fl*2 1t 2 4 dt 2 M3
0
1 31 2 fl*2 1t 2 4 dt.
The condition for the second mover is the same, except the second mover’s expected 
utility difference does not have to be conditioned on the first mover choosing r. We 
get
 elD2(s2; fl*1)
 fl
*
2 1s22 5               for all s2 [ 30, 14 , 1 1 elD2(s2; fl*1)
where
 3
0
s2 31 2 fl*11t 2 4 dt
 D2 1s2; fl*12 5                2 M. 3
0
1 31 2 fl*11t 2 4 dt
Logit QrE in cutpoint strategies.—Next, we consider the slightly more sophis-
ticated version of QRE, where players are assumed to randomize over monotone 
cutpoint strategies, which we call QRE-cut. In our game, a cutpoint strategy is a 
critical value of strength, c, such that player i chooses f if si $ c and chooses r if 
si , c. Hence, we define a cutpoint quantal response to be given by two probability 
distributions over c, one for each player, denoted q11c 2 and q2 1c 2 . In the simultane-
ous version of the game, we consider only symmetric QRE-cut, where q11c 2 5 q2 1c 2 
5 q 1c 2 for all c. For the sequential version, generally q11c 2 Z q2 1c 2 , since it is not a 
symmetric game and the second player chooses a cutpoint after observing the first 
player’s move. We use the logit quantal response function for a parametric specifica-
tion. Hence, the probability that a player chooses a particular strategy is proportional 
to the exponentiated expected payoff from using that strategy, given the cutpoint 
quantal response function of the other player. It is worth noting that past studies have 
found that in binary choice games with continuous types, a cutpoint strategy can 
be a useful variation on the standard QRE approach (Casella, Gelman, and Palfrey 
2006). Furthermore, the analysis in Section IIIC suggests that subjects adhere to this 
type of strategy.
Consider the simultaneous game. The expected utility to player 1 of using a cut-
point strategy c˜ if player 2 uses q 1 · 2 is given by
(2)  u 1 c˜2 5 3
c˜
1
s ds 1 3
0
c˜ c3
0
s
q 1c 2 1cM 1 1s 2 c 2 2 dc 1 3
s
1
q 1c 2 cM dc d ds.
The first term is the probability of drawing a strength, s, above the cutpoint in 
which case player 1 chooses f and obtains a payoff one only if player 2 has a lower 
strength. The second term is the probability of drawing a strength, s, below the cut-
point in which case player 1 chooses r. Then, if player 2’s strength is lower, a com-
promise gives payoff M and a no compromise gives payoff one. If player 2’s strength 
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is higher, a compromise gives payoff M, and a no compromise gives payoff zero. In 
a symmetric logit QRE-cut,
 elu 1 c˜2
 q 1 c˜2 5            for all c˜ [ 30, 14 .
 3
0
1
elu 1c 2 dc
In the sequential game, the expression for the first mover’s utility of using c˜, given 
player 2 uses q2 1 · 2 is the same as in the simultaneous case:
(3)  u11 c˜2 5 3
c˜
1
s1 ds1 1 3
0
c˜ c3
0
s1
q2 1c 2 1cM 1 1s1 2 c 2 2 dc 1 3
s1
1
q2 1c 2 cM dc d ds1.
By contrast, the second mover’s utility of using c˜, given player 1 uses q11 · 2 does not 
have to be conditioned on the first mover choosing r. That is,
 3
0
s2
c1q11c12 dc1 3
s2
1
s2q11c12 dc1
(4)  u2 1 c˜2 5 3
c˜
1≥              1              ¥ ds2 1 c˜M. 3
0
1
c1q11c12 dc1 3
0
1
c1q11c12 dc1
There are three observations to make about the QRE-cut solutions. First, in the 
sequential game, the equilibrium cutpoint distributions are different for the two 
players. The second mover generally adopts lower cutpoints, which translates into 
higher f rates. Second, players adopt lower cutpoints when M is lower. Third, the 
cutpoint distributions for the first mover in the sequential games are different from 
the cutpoint distributions in the corresponding simultaneous games, even though the 
utility formulas (equations 2 and 3) are identical.
We fit the behavioral strategy logit QRE and the cutpoint strategy logit QRE models 
by standard maximum likelihood techniques, i.e., finding the value of l that maxi-
mizes the likelihood of the observed frequencies of strategies. We estimate restricted 
and unrestricted versions of the models. In the most restricted version, the parameters 
are constrained to be the same across all treatments. We also estimate a version where 
the parameters are constrained to be the same for the 0.39 and 0.50 treatments, but are 
allowed to be different in the simultaneous and sequential games.
B. cognitive hierarchy
The cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004) postulates that 
when a player makes a choice, his decision process corresponds to a “level of sophis-
tication,” k, with probability pk . The CH solution to a game is uniquely determined 
by an assumption about how level 0 types behave (s0), and the distribution of lev-
els of sophistication.11 Once the behavior of level 0 players is determined, level 1 
11 The CH model is an extension of the original level-k model of Nagel (1995). See Dale O. Stahl and Paul W. 
Wilson (1995), Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri (2007), Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), 
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 players are characterized by choosing with equal probability all strategies that are 
best responses to level 0 opponents. Level 2 players optimize assuming they face 
a distribution of level 0 and level 1 players, where the distribution satisfies trun-
cated rational expectations. That is, the beliefs of level 2 players that their opponent is 
choosing according to a level 0 or a level 1 decision process, denoted b2 102 and b2 112 , 
is given by the truncated “true” distribution of these types, b2 102 5 p0/ 1 p0 1 p12 and 
b2 112 5 p1/ 1p0 1 p12 . Level 2 players are then characterized by choosing with equal 
probability all strategies that are best responses to b2 beliefs about the opponents. 
Higher levels are defined analogously, so a level k optimizes with respect to beliefs 
bk, where bk 1 j 2 5 pj /gkl 2510 pl for all j [ 51, … , k 2 16.
For any distribution of levels, p, this implies a unique specification of a mixed 
strategy for each level, s 1p 2 5 1s0 1p 2 , … , sk 1 p 2 , …2 , and this specification can 
be solved recursively, starting with the lowest types. This generates predictions 
about the aggregate distribution of actions, denoted s– 1 p 2 5 g`k50 pk sk 1 p 2 . In all 
applications to date, p is assumed to be Poisson distributed with mean t, that is, 
pk 5 t
ke2t/ 1 k!2 for all k. We consider two specifications of the behavior of level 0 
types.
random Actions.—In the standard CH model, level 0 players are typically 
assumed to choose an action randomly. In the context of our game, this means that 
they are equally likely to select f or r, independent of their strength. Level 1 types 
best respond to level 0 types. It can be shown easily that the best response strategy 
is to choose cutpoint M. Level 2 players then optimize with a cutpoint somewhere 
between M (the best response if everyone is level 0) and M2 (the best response if 
everyone is level 1), with the exact value depending on p0 and p1 . Behavior by higher 
level players is defined recursively.
random cutpoints.—An alternative version, which we call the cutpoint cognitive 
hierarchy model or CH-cut, replaces the assumption that level 0 types randomize 
uniformly over actions, with the assumption that they randomize uniformly over 
cutpoint strategies. This implicitly endows level 0 types with some amount of ratio-
nality in the form of monotone behavior. They are more likely to choose f when 
their strength is high than when their strength is low. In our game, a level 0 type who 
randomizes over cutpoints has a probability of fighting as a function of s, which is 
equal to s. As in the standard CH, the best responses of higher types will be unique 
cutpoints, and are easily calculated by recursion. Since a level 0 type has a prob-
ability 1 2 s of choosing r, the posterior distribution of strength of a level 0 type 
conditional on choosing r is
 1 2 s
 f 1s Z r 2 5             5 2 2 2s.
 3
0
111 2 x 2 dx
and Camerer, Palfrey, and Rogers (2006) for further examples of estimation of level-k models based on experi-
mental data.
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Hence, the expected payoff of f for a level 1 type with strength s, and conditional 
on the other player being level 0 and choosing r, is e0
s 12 2 2x 2 dx 5 2s 2 s2. Since 
the payoff of r is M, the optimal cutpoint of a level 1 type is the value s1
M that solves 
2s1
M 2 1s1M22 5 M, that is s1M 5 1 2  √ _____ 1 2 M. For our two treatments, we get s10.50 
5 1 2  √ ___ 1/2 < 0.29 and s10.39 5 1 2  √ 
_____ 11/18 < 0.22. Higher types are then defined 
recursively, with the exact cutpoint for a level k depending on 5pl6 kl5210. This produces 
a CH model that is comparable to QRE in the sense that all players choose cutpoint 
strategies, so f probabilities are monotone in s for all players.
We fit the Poisson specification of the CH and cutpoint CH models to the data-
set by finding the value of t that maximizes the likelihood of the observed aggre-
gate frequencies of strategies, under the assumption that types are identically and 
independently distributed draws. We estimate the best-fitting values of t by maxi-
mum the likelihood for each of the four treatments, and report both constrained and 
unconstrained estimates.
C. combining Quantal response and strategic hierarchies (TQrE)
The predictions of the CH and CH-cut models differ from the QRE and QRE-cut 
models in two important ways. First, in CH models, all players with the same level 
of sophistication choose the same cutpoint strategy. Second, predictions in CH are 
identical for the sequential and simultaneous versions of the game. Neither “bunch-
ing” by layers of reasoning nor identical behavior in the simultaneous and sequential 
treatments are observed in the data.
An approach that combines quantal response and hierarchical thinking, called 
Truncated Quantal Response Equilibrium (TQRE), is developed in Camerer, Palfrey, 
and Rogers (2006). This model introduces a countable number of players’ skill lev-
els, l0, l1, … , lk, … . The distribution of skill levels in the population is given by 
p0, p1, … , pk, … . A player with skill level k chooses stochastically with a logit quantal 
response function with precision lk. TQRE assumes truncated, rational expectations 
in a similar manner to CH. A player with precision lk has beliefs pj
k 5 pj /gkl 2510 pl for 
j , k and pj
k 5 0 for j $ k. For reasons of parsimony and comparability to CH, we 
assume that skill levels are Poisson distributed and equally spaced lk 5 gk. Thus, it 
is a two parameter model with Poisson parameter, t, and a spacing parameter, g.
The TQRE model has two effects. It smooths out the mass points, and it makes 
different predictions for the sequential and simultaneous games. These effects work 
slightly differently with behavioral strategies and with cutpoint strategies, so we 
estimate both versions.
D. cursed Equilibrium
In a CE model, players are assumed to systematically underestimate the correla-
tion between the opponents’ action and information. As in the CH model, a cursed 
equilibrium will be the same in both the sequential and simultaneous treatments. In 
an a-cursed equilibrium (CEa) all players are a-cursed. However, players believe 
that opponents are a-cursed with probability 11 2 a 2 , and they believe that actions 
of opponents are independent of their information with probability a. All players 
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optimize with respect to this (incorrect) mutually held belief about the joint distri-
bution of opponents’ actions and information. In our model, we can easily compute 
the cutpoint strategy in CEa as a function of M, denoted sa* 1M2 . For a player with 
strength si, and assuming the other player is using sa* 1M2 , the expected utility of f, 
conditional on the opponent choosing r is given by
 Vf
a 1si 2 5 aPr 5sj , si6 1 11 2 a 2Pr 5sj , si Z aj 5 r, sa* 1M2 6
 si
 5 asi 1 11 2 a 2 min 51,      6. sa* 1M2
A player with strength equal to the equilibrium cutpoint must be indifferent between 
f and r. Formally, Vf
a 1sa* 1M2 2 5 Vra 1sa* 1M2 2 . Therefore,12
 1 2 M
 1 2         if a . 1 2 M
 a
 sa* 1M2 5 µ                      .
 0  if a # 1 2 M
A difficulty with CEa is that it cannot be fit to the data due to a zero-likelihood 
problem: for each a it makes a point prediction. Therefore, we slightly modify the 
equilibrium concept in order to allow for stochastic choice. The approach we fol-
low is to combine QRE with CEa.
13 In the simultaneous move game, a (symmetric) 
a-QRE is a behavior strategy, or a set of probabilities of choosing f, one for each 
value of s [ 30, 14 . We denote such a strategy evaluated at a specific strength value 
by f 1s 2 . Given l and a, we denote by a-QRE the behavior strategy f*la. If player j 
is using f*la and player i is a-cursed, then i’s expected payoff from choosing f when 
si 5 s is given by
 Vf
a 1s 2 5 3
0
1
f*la 1t 2 dt 3as 1 11 2 a 2 Pr 5sj , s Z aj 5 f, f*la64
 1 3
0
1 31 2 f*la 1t 2 4 dt 3as 1 11 2 a 2 Pr 5sj , s Z aj 5 r, f*la64
 5 as3
0
1
f*la 1t 2 dt 1 11 2 a 23
0
s
f*la 1t 2 dt
 1 as3
0
1 31 2 f*la 1t 2 4 dt 1 11 2 a 23
0
s 31 2 f*la 1t 2 4 dt.
12 In a fully cursed equilibrium (a 5 1), all players choose strategies as if there is no correlation between the 
opponent’s action and information. Thus, they all behave like a level 1 player in CH with random actions, s1* 1M2 
5 M.
13 Note that player heterogeneity with respect to a would not solve the zero-likelihood problem. For any 
cursedness a [ 30, 14 , it is always true that sa* 1M2 # M. However, in our data set, we have many observations where 
players with strength s . M choose r.
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And the expected payoff from choosing r is
 Vr
a 1s 2 5 as3
0
1
f*la 1t 2 dt 1 11 2 a 23
0
s
f*la 1t 2 dt 1 M3
0
1 31 2 f*la 1t 2 4 dt.
Using the logit specification for the quantal response function, we then apply logit 
choice probabilities to the difference in the expected payoff from f and r for each si 
5 s. By inspection of Vf
a 1s 2 and Vra 1s 2 , this difference is
 D 1s; f*la2 5 as3
0
1 31 2 f*la 1t 2 4 dt 1 11 2 a 23
0
s 31 2 f*la 1t 2 4 dt 2 M3
0
1 31 2 f*la 1t 2 4 dt,
and the a-QRE in the simultaneous game is then characterized by
 elD 1s; fl*a 2
 f*la 1s 2 5                for all s [ 30, 14 , 1 1 elD 1s; fl*a 2
which can be solved numerically, for any value of a.
In the sequential version of the game, we simultaneously need to solve for the 
first and second movers, f*la1 and f
*
la2, respectively. The expected payoff equations 
under f and r for the first mover are the same as in the simultaneous move game. 
So, we have
 Vf
a
11s12 5 as13
0
1
f*la2 1s22 ds2 1 11 2 a 23
0
s1
f*la2 1s22 ds2
 1 as13
0
1 31 2 f*la2 1s22 4 ds2 1 11 2 a 23
0
s1 31 2 f*la2 1s22 4 ds2
 Vr
a
1 1s12 5 as13
0
1
f*la2 1s22 ds2 1 11 2 a 23
0
s1
f*la2 1s22 ds2 1 M3
0
1 31 2 f*la2 1s22 4 ds2.
However, the expressions for the second mover are different, because expected pay-
offs are conditional on the observation that the first mover chose r:
 3
0
s2 31 2 f*la11s12 4 ds1
 Vf
a
2 1s22 5 as2 1 11 2 a 2                   ;
 3
0
1 31 2 f*la11s12 4 ds1
 Vr
a
2 1s22 5 M.
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So, the payoff differences for the first and second movers are, respectively:
 3
0
s1 31 2 f*la2 1s22 4 ds2
 D11s1; f*la22 5 3
0
1 31 2 f*la2 1s22 4 ds2≥as1 1 11 2 a 2                     2 M¥ ;
 3
0
1 31 2 f*la2 1s22 4 ds2
 3
0
s2 31 2 f*la11s12 4 ds1
 D2 1s2; f*la12 5 as2 1 11 2 a 2                  2 M.
 3
0
1 31 2 f*la11s12 4 ds1
Note that the RHS of D2 is similar to the RHS of D1, except for the factor of 
e0
1 31 2 f*la2 1s22 4 ds2. Since this factor is smaller than one, it means that the payoff 
differences to player 2 are magnified relative to player 1, which, in equilibrium, will 
result in f*la2 having higher slope and lower mean compared to f
*
la1. The two logit 
equilibrium conditions are:
 elD11s1; f*la22
 f*la11s12 5                 for all s1 [ 30, 14 ,
 1 1 elD11s1; f*la22
 elD2 1s2; f*la12
 f*la2 1s22 5                 for all s2 [ 30, 14 .
 1 1 elD2 1s2; f*la12
One can fit the logit version of the a-QRE model to the dataset by finding the 
values of l and a that maximize that likelihood of the observed frequencies of strat-
egies. As for the previous models, we report both constrained and unconstrained 
estimates.
E. Models of Pro-social Behavior
We also considered an alternative class of models which are not based on cogni-
tive limitation but, instead, are founded on social preferences. There are a number of 
candidates from this growing family of models. We consider three. One is the fair-
ness model by Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999). In that model, the utility of 
individual i when he gets payoff xi and individual j gets payoff xj is
 ui 1xi, xj 2 5 xi 2 a max 5xj 2 xi, 06 2 b max 5xi 2 xj, 06,
where b # a and 0 # b , 1. For our game, the model implies that the utility payoff 
to each agent for winning, compromising, and losing is 1 2 b, M, and 2a, respec-
tively. This implies that if fairness considerations are sufficiently strong (b $ 1 2 
M), the equilibrium unravelling goes in the opposite direction, and all agents always 
play r, regardless of their strength. Otherwise, agents want to set a lower cutpoint 
than their rival, and we are back to the Nash equilibrium prediction where all agents 
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always play f. Our subjects do not exhibit such extreme “boundary” behavior, nei-
ther individually nor in the aggregate. Thus, one would need to add other parameters 
or assumptions in order for this model to explain the choices of our subjects.
A second model is altruism, where a player’s utility is the weighted average of his 
own payoff and the other agent’s payoff:
 ui 1xi, xj 2 5 gxi 1 11 2 g 2xj .
This model runs into the same problem as the previous one. Each player’s payoff of 
winning, compromising, and losing is g, M, and 1 2 g, respectively. Therefore, all play-
ers should either always fight or always retreat. Given estimates of g from other experi-
ments (g . 0.5), the model predicts that players should always fight if M # 0.50.
Third, models based on reciprocity are also prominent in the social preferences 
literature. These models provide an explanation for the behavior commonly observed 
in the trust game. In our setting, they suggest that second movers should fight less 
than first movers, as they are “returning the favor” of compromising. However, we 
find the opposite: observing r significantly decreases the willingness to reciprocate 
by responding also with r.
Overall, these leading models of social preferences described above—fairness, 
altruism, and reciprocity—fail to explain the basic patterns we observe in the data. 
Therefore, we do not estimate them. In fact, there are at least two additional reasons 
why models of prosocial behavior are unsuitable to account for the choices of sub-
jects in this particular game. First, each individual plays the game many times (40), 
anonymously, against a pool of opponents, with the roles of players and the strengths 
randomly assigned in each match. Given this design, applying models of social pref-
erences to behavior in isolated games is questionable a priori. In fact, in one of the 
designs (M 5 0.50), subjects play a constant sum game against changing opponents. 
Hence, deviations from optimal best replies to “the field” will necessarily, over the 
course of the 40 matches, give a player a total expected payoff below the average 
payoff of the other subjects. Second and related to the above argument, in this game 
selfish play leads to ex ante fair and efficient allocations. Indeed, for the case of 
M 5 0.39, myopic “fair” behavior (everyone retreating every time) leads to long 
run inefficient outcomes and no long run improvement in the equality of payoffs. 
Subjects would be leaving over 20 percent of potential group earnings on the table, 
with virtually zero gain in equality of outcomes.
F. Model Estimates
In this section, we estimate the QRE, CH, TQRE, and CE models. We explore the 
stability of the estimated parameters across the different treatments, and compare 
the ability of these models to capture the basic features of the data identified in the 
previous section. We report the estimates in Table 8 at different levels of aggrega-
tion: for the treatments separately, pooling across the M-treatments, and pooling 
across all treatments. For the QRE, CH, and TQRE models, we considered both 
the behavioral strategy version and the cutpoint version. In all three models, the 
 cutpoint version fits the data better than the behavioral strategy version in every 
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single treatment and in all the pooled estimations. This is not surprising, given our 
earlier finding that most subjects exhibit choice behavior that is consistent with a 
cutpoint strategy. We therefore report and discuss only the results for the cutpoint 
versions of these models.
Figure 3 displays the empirical and fitted fighting probabilities as a function of 
strength. Fitted choice frequencies in the figure are based on out-of-sample param-
eter estimates. Specifically, the displayed curves for the sequential data are con-
structed using the parameter estimates obtained from the pooled simultaneous data, 
and vice versa. All these models capture the upward sloping empirical frequency of 
f. All exhibit low f rates for low strengths and high f rates for high strengths.
There is some variation in fit across the different models. The better fitting mod-
els all converge to fighting probabilities of zero for low strengths and one for high 
strengths. The a-QRE model, which generally fits the best of all these models, does 
not have cutpoints built into it explicitly, but boils down to a “soft” cutpoint model. 
The CH and QRE models fit the data similarly in terms of log likelihood, but there 
are some important differences in the predicted fight curves. As one can see from 
Figure 3, the CH model predicts somewhat better at strengths below 20, but QRE 
generally fits better than CH elsewhere. This can be attributed to two important 
differences in the models: (a) QRE predicts that second movers will have different 
(and sharper) response functions than first movers, which is a feature of the data not 
captured by CH; and (b) QRE generates a smooth fight curve, while CH predicts 
clustering of cutpoints, leading to jumps in the fight curve corresponding to different 
levels of sophistication.
The TQRE model does not provide a substantial improvement over QRE or CH. 
In fact, the fitted f-rate for TQRE and QRE are very similar. They both share the 
problem of overestimating the fighting rates for subjects with low strength. The 
a-QRE is the best fitting of all models, as it combines the elements of cursedness 
and stochastic choice. The pure cursed equilibrium predicts the steepest response 
of fighting probability as a function of strength. In fact, all players follow the same 
cutpoint strategy, which is a function of a, the players’ degree of cursedness. Adding 
quantal response produces a nice logit function of the fighting probability that 
crosses 0.50 at s < 0.40, varying slightly with M and position, consistent with the 
data. Furthermore, quantal response also introduces a steeper f curve for the second 
movers than for the first movers, which is again consistent with the data.
There are some differences in fit between the M 5 0.39 and the M 5 0.50 treat-
ments, with most models fitting the data from the M 5 0.39 treatment better, reflecting 
Table 8—Model Estimates
QrE ch TQrE a-QrE
n l 2ln L t 2ln L g t 2ln L l a 2ln L
sim 0.39 560 20.8 171.0 0.6 183.2 4.4 5.0 170.5 26.6 0.92 145.5
sim 0.50 560 11.3 213.6 0.3 211.7 449.0 0.4 210.3 18.4 0.77 202.9
sim All 1,120 16.2 387.8 0.5 397.4 6.9 2.7 386.3 21.3 0.85 355.6
seq 0.39 395 11.5 125.0 0.4 137.1 6.0 2.4 124.6 23.5 0.97 102.0
seq 0.50 386 9.3 140.5 0.5 137.9 142.0 0.5 136.6 15.8 0.75 138.2
seq All 781 10.4 265.3 0.4 275.1 8.0 1.8 263.5 18.4 0.86 248.9
All 1,901 13.0 656.8 0.5 672.6 10.0 1.8 651.2 20.1 0.85 605.9
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the steeper empirical f curves in the M 5 0.39 data. There is virtually no difference 
in either the fit or the actual parameter estimates for the sequential and simultaneous 
treatments. The a-QRE pooled estimates of l and a are not significantly different 
between the two treatments, even at the 5 percent level, and the fit is identical (log 
Likelihood / n 5 20.318 in both cases).
G. summary of Estimation results
The main findings about the estimated models are summarized as follows.
	 • All four models capture the most basic qualitative properties of behavior (none 
of which is consistent with Nash equilibrium). Fight rates are high but well 
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Figure 3. Empirical and Fitted Fight Rates
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below 100 percent, increasing in s, and decreasing in M. Each model captures 
different specific features of the data, however.
	 • Estimates are similar across M treatments, and little power is lost by pooling 
treatments. This means that the results are not due to “tuning the parameters 
to fit the data.” In fact, the out-of-sample parameters from M 5 0.39 provide 
virtually identical predictions for M 5 0.50 behavior as the within sample 
estimates.
	 • Only QRE and the models hybridized with QRE capture the fact that first 
movers behave differently from second movers. In particular, the f function is 
steeper for second movers in those models.
	 • The cutpoint versions of CH and QRE describe behavior better than the behav-
ior strategy versions. This is consistent with our findings at the individual level 
which indicate that over 95 percent of choices follow pure cutpoint strategies.
	 • TQRE provides an almost identical fit as QRE, suggesting that, in this game, 
the addition of hierarchical thinking to quantal response does not have a sub-
stantial impact. This is also consistent with the fact that we do not find indi-
vidual cutpoints clustered around three or four strength values, as would be 
predicted by CH and other levels-of-sophistication models.
	 • The a-QRE model fits the data best. The estimates of a are significantly greater 
than zero and significantly less than one. They are virtually identical for both 
the sequential and simultaneous games, suggesting that the two-parameter 
model is not overfitting the data.
V. Conclusions
The compromise game is obviously challenging to the cognitive abilities of play-
ers. In our experiment, players seem to understand some basic elements of the game, 
such as the cutpoint nature of best responses. They have problems figuring out the 
full logic of the unravelling argument, however.
The paper has considered several cognitive explanations for the surprising behavior 
observed in this game of incomplete information. In future research, it might be inter-
esting to explore more general models. One candidate would be the “analogy-based 
expectation equilibrium” developed by Philippe Jehiel (2005) and Jehiel and Frederic 
Koessler (2006) which can be seen as an alternative version of cursed equilibrium. A 
second direction would be to explicitly allow for heterogeneity. While the CH model 
is suggestive of heterogeneity, the attempts here and elsewhere to fit the model assume 
homogeneity, since repeated observations of the same individual are treated as inde-
pendent draws from the type space. In principle, one could extend the estimation of 
CH models to allow for fixed types. However, for our data, it seems unlikely to go very 
far because we do not observe clusters of behavior that might correspond to types—in 
contrast to Nagel’s (1995) guessing game, for example. The QRE and a-QRE models 
could also be extended to allow for heterogeneity with respect to l and a, also with 
fixed types. This would undoubtedly lead to better fits in terms of log likelihood, but 
it is hard to imagine any new insights emerging from such an exercise.
One of the most interesting findings is that the order of moves affects choices. 
In our game, a player’s action is relevant only if the rival chooses r. Thus, first, 
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second, and simultaneous movers should all condition their strategy on that event. 
By contrast, the data shows that players who observe r being played by their rival 
(second movers) respond more aggressively than players who must condition on the 
anticipation of that event (first movers). Even among subjects who do not observe 
the choice of the rival before playing, there is a difference between knowing that 
one’s choices will be publicly observed before the rival makes his choice (first mov-
ers) and knowing that one’s choices will not be observed (simultaneous movers). In 
sum, hypothetical conditioning on events seems to produce different behavior than 
observational conditioning on events. While we found one general explanation for 
this phenomenon (QRE), a search for other parsimonious formal models that imply 
different behavior between our first and second movers might add to our understand-
ing. Such a search seems a worthy project for future research. It could also help settle 
questions well beyond the scope of our compromise game, such as the effect of using 
the strategy method in experimental games and the differences in behavior between 
strategically equivalent games (extensive versus strategic form). Naturally, this has 
implications for many strategic settings of significant applied interest, including 
common value auctions and voting behavior, where optimal choice requires bidders 
to condition on winning and voters to condition on being pivotal.
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